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Contextual View of Humor
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Gabriella Airenti*
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In the developmental literature, the idea has been proposed that young children do not
understand the specificity of non-literal communicative acts. In this article, I focus on
young children’s ability to produce and understand different forms of humor. I explore the
acquisition of the communicative contexts that enable children to engage in humorous
interactions before they possess the capacity to analyze them in the terms afforded by
a full-fledged theory of mind. I suggest that different forms of humor share several basic
features and that we can construct a continuum from simple to sophisticated forms. In
particular, I focus on teasing, a form of humor already present in preverbal infants that is
also considered a typical feature of irony. I argue that all forms of humor can be regarded
as a type of interaction that I propose to call “playing with expectations.”
Keywords: humor development, communicative games, teasing, irony, theory of mind
INTRODUCTION
In studies of communication, the interpretation of non-literal, indirect or figurative meaning
occupies a distinct place. Various views have been advanced on this topic. In pragmatics, the
classical two-stage theories distinguish a primary literal interpretation from a non-literal secondary
interpretation, which can be developed only through the analysis and failure of the former (Grice,
1957, 1969; Searle, 1969). Subsequent psycholinguistic studies show the cognitive implausibility of
the classical perspective (see, for instance, Clark and Lucy, 1975), and more recent theories analyze
the multifaceted aspects of non-literal meaning interpretation (Wilson and Sperber, 1992; Giora,
1997). It is generally agreed that the differences between models correspond to the way context is
analyzed and considered (Gibbs and Colston, 2012).
Non-literal communication includes numerous forms, such as indirect speech acts, metaphors,
jokes, irony, and hyperbole. These forms occur commonly in everyday adult communication. Do
they also occur in children’s communication? Certainly, when communicating with children, adults
do not refrain from using non-literal expressions. Consider, for instance, the following examples:
– Wanna go for a bike ride?
– You have a full dish in front of you.
– Your brother is an ogre.
– Tom’s cat is as big as an elephant.
– I love children who keep their rooms clean.
When are children able to master these forms (i.e., to comprehend and produce them)? Are all
of them cognitively equivalent? The few systematic studies that have been conducted suggest that
acquisition does not follow a unique progression. Some forms are simpler to master than others
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 1 September 2016 | Volume 7 | Article 1392
fpsyg-07-01392 September 16, 2016 Time: 17:1 # 2
Airenti Playing with Expectations
(Bosco et al., 2013). It is therefore important to understand the
reasons for differences in the ease of comprehension and to
delineate specific paths of acquisition.
One hypothesis asserts that different forms of non-literal
communication can be distinguished based on the role of
theory of mind (ToM) abilities. The most demanding tasks
require developed ToM abilities to comprehend the speaker’s
meaning. For instance, according to Winner (1988), children
comprehend metaphors before irony because understanding
metaphors does not involve questioning the speaker’s beliefs,
whereas comprehending irony involves attributing second-order
beliefs to the speaker. In this paper, I argue that children
may perform complex non-literal communicative acts before
developing full-fledged ToM abilities.
An important question arises concerning the relationship
between use and interpretation. Adults and children differ
markedly with respect to this relationship. Theories may differ
on how the chain of inferences that enables interpretation
is constructed. Nonetheless, adults are undoubtedly able to
interpret non-literal communication. If an adult laughs at a
joke, we presume that s/he has understood its humor, and if
s/he produces a joke, we assume that s/he has intentionally
produced humor. When children produce humor, however, we
are unsure whether they do so intentionally. Does the fact that
a child laughs at a joke indicate that s/he has understood it?
If the child makes us laugh, did the child do so intentionally,
or was the humor unintended such that we, the audience, are
creating it? In the case of adults, we do not pose the problem
of the meaning of comprehension. Instead, we presume that use
and comprehension are linked. In the case of children, this link
remains unclear.
In the developmental literature, the idea is often advanced
that young children do not understand the specificity of non-
literal communicative acts and cannot distinguish, for instance,
between an ironic statement or a hyperbole and a lie (Peterson
et al., 1983; Demorest et al., 1984; Winner and Leekam, 1991;
Sullivan et al., 1995; Winner et al., 1998). For young children
utterances are either true or false, and when they are false, they
can only be lies. Thus, it is reasoned, young children cannot
properly appreciate non-literal communication.
This perspective is limited; it highlights only the tasks at
which young children fail. Conversely, I aim to understand
what young children are able to do. I believe this perspective
might help to reconstruct the developmental path and thus
to more effectively understand mature comprehension of non-
literal communication. In this article, I focus specifically on
young children’s ability to produce and understand different
forms of humor.
My argument proceeds as follows. I identify the forms of
humor that children typically use through several examples
drawn primarily from parents’ reports. I then discuss the
difficulties highlighted in the literature regarding the definition
and categorization of different forms of humor. I specifically
address the relationship between humor and irony. I explore
the acquisition of the communicative contexts that constitute
the background that enables children to engage in humorous
interactions before being able to analyze them using full-fledged
ToM abilities. I assume that young children react differently
to lies and to non-literal communication. Finally, I present a
theoretical proposal: I argue that different forms of humor share
some basic features and that we can construct a continuum from
simple to sophisticated forms. I focus on teasing, a form of humor
already present in preverbal infants that is also considered a
typical feature of irony. I conclude that all forms of humor can
be considered a type of interaction that I propose to call “playing
with expectations.”
CHILDREN’S USE OF HUMOR1
Children are involved in humorous communicative interactions
from a very young age (Groch, 1974; Bainum et al., 1984; Dubois
et al., 1984; Bergen, 1989; Reddy, 1991, 2008; Loizou, 2005;
Cameron et al., 2008; Hoicka and Akhtar, 2012; Mireault et al.,
2012). From a developmental perspective, the earliest cases of
humorous interactions are amusing situations that occur between
infants and adults. Two cases are typical. Adults propose an
amusing action, such as tickling, odd faces or sounds, or blowing
a raspberry. Children playfully respond to the action, and the
interaction becomes a shared game. Sometimes the child initiates
the interaction, often inadvertently, with a gesture or a sound that
provokes amusement in the adult. This amused response pleases
the child, who intentionally repeats the gesture to obtain the
same reaction, and the game becomes shared. These humorous
games are non-verbal and simple. Reddy (2008) classifies them as
clowning, or the violation of normal patterns of behavior to elicit
amusement.
The other type of humor commonly observed with young
children is teasing.
Consider two examples.
When asked to make the sound of a horse (Come fa il cavallo?),
a 2.5-year-old girl answers, “Moo” (Muh) and laughs.
Another parent reports an incident with her daughter, also
2.5 years old: “I asked Becky, ‘What is the cat’s call?’ (Come fa
il gatto?). She answered ‘chirp’ (cip cip) and laughed. Then, she
corrected herself: ‘No, mom, it meows! (Ma no, mamma, fa miao
miao).”
Reddy (2008) showed that this form of humor is precocious,
starting at approximately 9 months of age. Relying on parents’
reports, Reddy distinguished three types of teasing in young
children: provocative non-compliance, offer and withdrawal of
an object or of the self and disrupting others’ activities. In
all of these types, children playfully disturb an interaction by
performing “the mis-expected” (Reddy and Mireault, 2015).
As these authors note, teasing, even in its simplest forms,
1Unless otherwise specified, all examples of young children’s humor production
presented in this paper are from parents’ reports collected under the supervision
of the author in various Italian regions. We instructed parents of children aged
2–6 years to record all humorous communicative acts produced by their children
in a given month and the context in which they were produced. We conducted
a quantitative analysis on the reports of 90 children (Airenti and Angeleri,
submitted). However, the examples presented here are derived from a larger sample
of 300 reports. The author thanks the families who participated and Giulia Giacone,
Sara Ferrero, Caterina Mancini, and Rachele Barresi for their assistance with
collecting and coding the reports.
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requires the display of cognitive abilities. In particular, the
child must have expectations regarding the interlocutor’s actions.
For instance, in an offer/withdrawal, the infant must expect
the interlocutor to extend her arm, open her hand and wait
for the child to release the object. The child also expects the
interlocutor to express surprise and disappointment after the
withdrawal, and this response is the source of amusement.
The authors assert that the wide spectrum of typical cases
of teasing observed in young children indicates that “the
range of things infants can do to tease their parents seems
as large as the expectations parents have of the infants”
(ibid.).
More precisely, based on my analysis of the existing literature
and the parents’ reports I collected, it appears that parents’
expectations exploited by young children may be either relational
or linked to newly acquired skills. As examples of the first
situation, consider the cases of contradicting expectations of
kissing or hugging, withdrawing at the last moment, or playing
with parents’ fears of approaching a dangerous or precious (and
forbidden) object and withdrawing at the last moment.
One example was observed in a 2.3-year-old girl. “The aunt
asked her, ‘Marta, will you give me a kiss?,’ to which she replied:
‘No, never!’ (No, mai!). The aunt looked sad, and [the girl]
smothered her with kisses.”
A good example of fears is reported in Corsaro (1997).
Corsaro’s daughter had just begun climbing chairs and other
objects that parents consider dangerous to climb. Once, she
climbed onto the seatback of a large armchair. When her father
attempted to remove her from the seatback, she smiled broadly.
According to the author, she seemed to be saying, “Look, dad,
where I have gone this time!”
Common examples of playing with skills include those
introduced earlier, such as deliberately attributing the wrong
calls to animals, calling the father “mom” or the mother “dad,”
or claiming that the sister (or the grandmother or the aunt) is
a male, whereas the brother (or the grandfather or the uncle)
is a female. Children typically play with newly acquired skills,
a tendency confirmed in the literature. Garvey (1977) includes
the cases of misnaming in the form of social playing, which
consists of playing with speech acts and discourse conventions.
She suggests that as soon as children have learned a rule, they have
fun distorting or exaggerating it. Dunn (1988) argues that such
episodes, which characterize the beginning of the development of
a sense of humor in children, are motivated by the pleasure of
performing forbidden acts. The fact that young children perform
this game with newly acquired abilities indicates intentional
teasing. Children play with parents’ uncertainty, as parents may
be unsure whether the child is making a joke or a genuine
mistake. The expression of uncertainty or trouble is, in turn, the
source of amusement.
What form of communication does this type of humor
represent? In at least one of the examples mentioned, the child
explicitly indicated that her first response was not a mistake but
an intentional joke. Often, however, the child makes no explicit
declaration but displays what parents identify as a pert or ironic
smile.
If we consider the development of teasing in older children,
we may add a new category to the categories identified by Reddy,
namely, mocking (Airenti and Angeleri, submitted).
Consider an example mentioned by Garvey (1977). David,
a 5-year-old boy, laughed and misnamed parts of his face. For
instance, he pointed to his forehead and said, “Here is my mouth”
to mock his 2-year-old sister, who had previously shown an adult
her likely newly acquired ability to identify parts of her face (i.e.,
eyes, nose, and mouth). In Garvey’s case, the target is the little
sister. In other situations, the targets may be strangers or other
family members. Typical cases may involve imitating adults’
funny behavior or appearance, such as a grandfather snoring or a
mother putting on makeup.
Consider an example from my corpus. A 3.3-year-old boy,
exaggerating his mother’s thinking mood, says, “Let us see, let us
see...” (Vediamo un po’, vediamo un po’....).
However, older children also use forms of humor typically
used by younger children, such as offer/withdrawal: “Mom, I
brought you a cookie!” says a 4.7-year-old boy. When the mother,
thanking him, approaches her son to obtain the cookie, the child
eats it.
The following example illustrates a case of playing with
expectations regarding new skills: a 6.3-year-old boy tells his
mother, “Today the teacher scolded me because I was not able
to read...I got an A! (10 e lode).”
The following example demonstrates play with relational
expectations. A mother reports an incident with her 6.5-year-old
daughter: “We are at the table, and my daughter looks at us and
says, ‘You are old, but dad is the oldest in the house! Ah, ah! I am
kidding, you are the most beautiful parents in the world,’ and she
gets up and hugs us.”
The following example is of disrupting others’ activity (3.1-
year-old girl): the grandmother is counting money aloud, and her
granddaughter says numbers at random to confuse her.
In conclusion, teasing represents an intriguing form of humor
because it develops precociously, yet older children and adults
also use it. Keltner et al. (2001) conducted a comprehensive
review of this form of interaction at different ages and proposed
the following definition: teasing is intentional provocation
accompanied by playful markers that together comment on
something relevant to the target.
Consider the following instances of other forms of humorous
interactions drawn from parents’ reports.
(1) “The child, looking at the rain, says, ‘What a beautiful day,
mom! It is ideal to go to the beach!’ (Che bella giornata mamma!
È proprio l’ideale per andare al mare!).” (girl, 6.5 years old)
(2) “I said, ‘Today I have prepared pizza,’ and my child said,
‘Mom, how disgusting! You made the wurstel pizza!’ (Mamma
che schifo! Hai fatto la pizza con i wurstel!), his preferred pizza,
and he plunged [toward his plate] to eat it (e si è tuffato a
mangiarla).” (boy, 5.3 years old)
(3) “Today, during lunch at [the] grandparents’ [home],
grandfather made [a] noise when eating his spaghetti. She [the
girl] started laughing and said, ‘Grandpa you are very elegant!’
(Lei ha cominciato a ridere e a dire ‘Nonno sei molto elegante!’).”
(girl, 5.3 years old)
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 3 September 2016 | Volume 7 | Article 1392
fpsyg-07-01392 September 16, 2016 Time: 17:1 # 4
Airenti Playing with Expectations
(4) “She says, ‘Mom let’s go to the beach. Today we have a fine
weather’ (Mamma andiamo al mare! È bello oggi il tempo!), while
outside it rains like all the other days.” (girl, 4.1 years old)
(5) “Sofia dropped her glass of water, and she looked at me in
a loving mood (modo amorevole) and said, ‘It was not me! It was
the glass, which did not want to live anymore!’ (non sono stata io!
è stato il bicchiere che non voleva più vivere).” (girl, 4.1 years old)
(6) “While I was doing the dishes, two glasses slipped from my
hands and broke. Martina immediately commented, ‘Eh, mom,
you are really good at doing the dishes!’ (Ehi, mamma, ma come
sei brava a lavare i piatti!).” (girl, 3.8 years old)
(7) “He plays with the sand, rolling over (rotolandosi) and
getting dirty all over (sporcandosi tutto); he makes castles with
a bucket and spade. I tell him, ‘You really like playing with sand,
eh?’ And he says: ‘No, I don’t like it at all!’ (No, non mi piace
affatto!).” (boy, 3.0 years old)
(8) “Today, while she was playing with her doll, she said,
‘Mom, she is your child! She wants chocolate, she, no me!’
(Mamma lei è tua bimba! Vuole cioccolata. . . lei, no io!).” (girl,
2.3 years old)
(9) “At lunch, she spilled water all over herself. She started
laughing and said, ‘Bath I take!’ (Bagnetto ho fatto!).” (girl,
2.3 years old)
Examples 1–3 appear to be typical ironic utterances. In fact,
the children who performed them were in the age range in
which, according to the literature, we can expect irony production
(Pexman et al., 2009; Recchia et al., 2010). Are the other examples
also instances of irony? They appear to resemble the previous
examples, but they are uttered by younger, sometimes much
younger, children. Example 4 is nearly identical to Example
1, the most classical instance of irony. Example 6 is a strong
case of irony. The other examples are less typical, though
nonetheless recognizable instances. Consider how we would
interpret equivalent utterances if an adult had performed them.
For instance, someone is finishing a glass of wine with evident
pleasure. In response to the remark “So you like white wine,
eh?,” the person answers, “No, I don’t like it at all” (semantically
equivalent to Example 7). We would consider this answer ironic.
Consider now the following example, analogous to Example 9:
someone spills a glass of water on his or her T-shirt and, laughing,
says, “I took a shower.” This statement seems to be a textbook
case of self-irony. If we consider the former two statements
ironic when adults utter them, why should we not do so when
similar statements are uttered by young children? Admittedly,
with young children, we may doubt that the production of humor
was intentional.
In the following sections, I discuss different ways of
interpreting children’s ability to use and understand these
forms of non-literal communication. First, however, I introduce
additional examples of humor that children typically perform
from a young age.
(10) “Hello, my little doll” (Ciao bambolotto mio). A 4.11-
year-old girl uses the phrase “little doll” to refer to her father
imitating her mother, who had greeted her with the words,
“Hello, little doll” (bambolotta mia). Note that when addressing
the father correctly, the child transitions from the feminine form
to the masculine form.
(11) A 3.3-year-old boy tells his mother, “Mind that if you
don’t behave I’ll call the traffic policemen” (Guarda che se non
ti comporti bene, chiamo i vigili!). In this case, the child employs
a typical expression used by Italian parents to calm overly excited
or misbehaving children.
Examples 11 and 12 are noteworthy because the humor
is produced by the fact that children use expressions with
parents that the latter normally use with them and that become
incongruous in this inverted form.
Consider another example:
(12) A 6.7-year-old girl is seated with a group of adults and
children at a coffee shop. When everyone orders hot chocolate,
she exclaims, “Well...I’ll take a beer!”
In this example, irony results from the child’s incongruous
appropriation of a behavior that the child cannot yet perform.
Examples 10–12 indicate that a typical way that children use
to produce humor is by uttering a statement that is normal when
spoken by an adult but becomes incongruous when uttered by
a child. Note that this incongruity applies to different forms of
humor. In clowning, we may observe gestures rather than words,
such as when a child wears her mother’s heels or walks with a
grandparent’s cane. It applies also to teasing, as in Example 11,
and to irony, as in Examples 10 and 12.
Based on the analysis of the reviewed examples of humor, the
following observations are evident:
– If we consider humor a form of communicative interaction,
distinguishing different forms of humor by age is not
straightforward. At all ages, we observe both simple and
more complex forms of humor. Although, we identify
two forms of humor typical of young children, namely,
clowning and teasing, we have seen that older children use
these forms as well. We also note instances of very young
children performing what is generally considered the most
sophisticated form of humor, irony.
– Children’s humor is multifaceted, but we can nonetheless
detect typical manifestations.
Thus far, we have analyzed forms of humor observed in
children of different ages. We have not closely examined the
current definitions of humor and irony. The next section
discusses these definitions from a more theoretical perspective.
HUMOR, IRONY, AND TEASING
This section presents the theoretical assumptions of my work. I
propose that the relationship among humor, irony and teasing
may be clarified by considering them different forms of a more
general communicative ability that appears early in development
and is characterized by playing with others’ expectations.
Definitions of humor and irony and their relationship are
widely debated in the literature. In cognitive studies, the most
accepted definition of humor derives from the work of Shultz
(1976) and McGhee (1979), who claim that incongruity with
respect to reality is the source of humor. Divergences exist in
the literature regarding the type of relation that a subject must
entertain with incongruity to perceive humor. McGhee maintains
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that the subject must be able to represent the incongruity, an
ability that children acquire at approximately 18 months of age.
Shultz considers a necessary condition to be the resolution of
incongruity, an ability that children acquire at 6 years of age.
Other authors, by contrast, consider the detection of incongruity
to be sufficient (Pien and Rothbart, 1976). This latter stance opens
the possibility that infants also display humor. An incongruity
becomes the source of humor when it arises within a playful
interaction. Recent research has shown that the social emotional
context is fundamental to infants’ humor perception (Hoicka and
Gattis, 2012; Mireault et al., 2015). In this relational perspective,
humor appreciation cannot be evaluated outside the interaction
in which it arises. In general, the relational approach admits
infants and very young children to its definition of humor. I aim
to extend this approach to forms of humor that older children
and adults produce, specifically irony.
Humor is difficult to define, and irony is even more difficult to
characterize (Gibbs and Colston, 2007). Since Grice’s definition
of irony as a violation of the maxim of quality (Grice, 1975,
1978), many authors have attempted to define irony to give an
account of forms of irony that do not result from such a violation.
Examples include the echo-mention theory (Wilson and Sperber,
1992), the echoic reminder theory (Kreuz and Glucksberg, 1989),
the pretense theory (Clark and Gerrig, 1984), the joint pretense
theory (Clark, 1996), the allusional pretense theory (Kumon-
Nakamura et al., 1995), the relevant inappropriateness theory
(Attardo, 2000), the implicit display theory (Utsumi, 2000), and
more recent neo-Gricean accounts (Dynel, 2013; Garmendia,
2015). The fact that no theory has definitively prevailed over
others can be attributed to the fact that irony is a multifaceted
phenomenon. Thus, every definition explains certain aspects
of irony, but no definition can explain all aspects. The same
claim can be asserted regarding the function of irony. Some
authors contend that irony functions to criticize a behavior in
a particularly aggressive way (Colston, 1997; Toplak and Katz,
2000). By contrast, the tinge hypothesis views irony as a way to
lessen criticism (Dews et al., 1995). Both situations are commonly
corroborated by empirical reports. Sometimes sarcasm makes a
criticism particularly harsh, whereas other times the mitigating
aspect of the indirect form prevails and the criticism is alluded
to but not explicitly uttered. A recent study has shown that
ironic criticism is perceived as simultaneously more mocking
and more polite (Boylan and Katz, 2013). Additionally, the
relationship between irony and sarcasm is debated. Some authors
use these two terms interchangeably, whereas other authors
stress the more aggressive nature of sarcasm that aims to
hurt the interlocutor (Lee and Katz, 1998). Other problems
are posed by the function of ironic compliments, such as in
the utterance “Selfish, as always!” directed toward someone
who has just acted generously. Thus, it seems that there are
various forms of irony and that irony may have different
functions.
However, these distinct theories appear to agree that
the recognition of irony always requires shared background
knowledge. In fact, it is only shared knowledge that allows one
to interpret an ironic utterance as such. This requirement is also
the cause of misunderstandings because sharedness is necessarily
attributed by actors to each other, and it is always possible for
an actor to interpret as shared something that is not (Airenti
et al., 1993b). Irony is not only based on shared presuppositions;
it may also stress them. “Irony is, in this way, a particularly
compelling means of reaffirming presuppositions common to
both the speaker-author and the audience” (Gibbs and Izett,
2005). These authors claim that empirical research shows that
people use irony to “specifically and succinctly comment on the
disparity between expectations or beliefs and what is actually
happening.”
Another unresolved question concerns the relationship
between humor and irony. As in the case of defining irony,
different answers have been proposed in the literature. Some
authors suggest that humor and irony share basic mechanisms
(Giora, 1995), whereas for others, humor is not the final goal
of irony but an associated phenomenon (Bryant, 2012). Gibbs
et al. (2014) maintain that it is impossible to discern a direct link
between irony and humor, even if laughter (or at least, a smile)
may often be associated with irony.
I suggest that the relationship between irony and humor may
be clarified if, rather than considering only adults, we analyze
forms of humor that young children also use, specifically teasing.
Linguists assert that teasing and irony must be considered distinct
phenomena, even if irony may be used to tease an interlocutor
(Dynel, 2014). Some psychologists have highlighted the teasing
aspect of irony (Pexman et al., 2005), but the relationship
between teasing and irony is more involved. Following the earlier
remarks about irony by Gibbs and Izett, irony can be defined in
terms of the disparity between reality and expectations, where
an expectation is based on shared presuppositions. From this
perspective, irony is a phenomenon continuous with teasing.
In fact, the two forms of humor differ only in the degree of
complexity of the presuppositions, which can be highly basic
in teasing, at least in young children’s teasing, but considerably
more sophisticated in irony. Compare irony and teasing with
respect to humor. If irony does not necessarily provoke laughter,
teasing also need not do so. Teasing, moreover, involves a latent
aggressive component that makes the teasing not necessarily
amusing, at least for one of the interlocutors. This lack of
amusement is clear in the case of disrupting others’ activities,
but in other forms of teasing, humor may also originate from
the disconcertment (or related feelings, such as disappointment,
embarrassment, and fear) displayed by the interlocutor. In such
cases, laughter may occur, but it is not always the immediate
expression.
Defining humor is complicated by the fact that the boundaries
separating its different forms are blurred (Norrick, 1993;
Attardo, 1994, 2002). However, if we adopt a cognitive
perspective and study humor in development, we notice that
very young children display basic aspects that evolve with age.
Specifically, I hypothesize that young children learn to play
humorous communicative games and that the main cognitive and
interactional features of these games persist in adult life.
In other words, I propose that humor is a form of
communication. Rather than delimiting different categories of
humor in linguistic terms, I suggest analyzing the cognitive
and interactive components of humor. I argue that different
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forms of humor depend on the degree of elaboration of different
components that define different types of communicative games.
From this perspective, let us consider the relationship between
irony and teasing. Angeleri and Airenti (2014) proposed the
following componential definition of irony: irony is a non-literal
utterance that is based on a common ground shared between
interlocutors, focuses on an unexpected incongruity, and includes
a teasing component.
We can adopt this perspective more generally and consider
that all forms of humor combine different constituents that may
co-occur to different degrees. Different communicative games
arise from these constituents. Without claiming to be exhaustive,
the following examples demonstrate such cognitive-interactional
constituents:
– Different degrees of teasing, implying different levels of
aggressiveness, may characterize different forms of humor,
ranging from mild irony to cruel sarcasm.
– Different games may select different targets of teasing, from
the actor herself in self-irony to the interlocutor or a third
party.
– Different degrees of indirectness may be possible. Note
that the much-discussed example “I love children who
keep their rooms clean” is only apparently a literally true
utterance. Rather, it is an indirect speech act because the
mother is reproaching her child for not having cleaned his
or her room.
– Games might differ with respect to the degree of
straightforwardness and spontaneity of the communicative
acts (with the aim of generating laughter and amusement)
and the degree of premeditation (e.g., a sarcastic expression
can be carefully planned to hurt the interlocutor).
– Different games may depend on the degree of complexity of
knowledge that constitutes the common ground enabling
the expectations, which are unfulfilled (e.g., explicit beliefs
or implicit background assumptions).
Because all of the identified components are already present
in young children’s teasing acts, I propose that teasing is the
prototypical form of humor.
Therefore, we can draw the following two conclusions:
– If regarded as communicative games, different forms of
humor cannot be differentiated by age.
– All forms of humor, even the more sophisticated instances,
can be characterized by playing with expectations, and
every form of humor includes a teasing component.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF HUMOR IN
COMMUNICATION: THE ROLE OF
THEORY OF MIND ABILITIES
In the developmental literature, a clear distinction has been
proposed between the acquisition of spontaneous forms of
humor, which is typical of infants and young children, and
sophisticated forms of humor, including irony. The use of simple
humor has been observed in children’s familiar contexts. For
these forms, the problem of comprehension has not been posed.
By contrast, the comprehension of sophisticated forms of humor
is considered a conceptual attainment that must be assessed with
classical experimental procedures. Most experimental studies
have shown that children’s understanding of irony does not begin
before 5 or 6 years of age (Dews and Winner, 1997). According
to the few published studies on this topic, production likewise
begins at this age (Pexman et al., 2009; Recchia et al., 2010).
Only Recchia et al. found examples of hyperbole in 4-year-olds1
that could be considered a display of irony. In these studies,
observations were completed for a predefined limited time in
specific contexts.
The late acquisition of irony is explained in terms of the ToM.
The comprehension of irony implies the attribution of second-
order beliefs to the speaker, or a full-fledged ToM (Winner
and Leekam, 1991; Sullivan et al., 1995; Hancock et al., 2000;
Filippova and Astington, 2008, 2010). However, as the previous
sections demonstrated, instances of children’s humor in natural
situations show that young children also make utterances that
would be defined as ironic when performed by adults. Thus,
one can argue that these utterances may seem ironic, but in
claiming that they are ironic, we would be attributing to the child
an intentionality that has not been proven. Considering these
utterances ironic would constitute an over-interpretation. This
perspective is supported by the fact that in experimental studies,
young children do not seem to understand the ironic character of
utterances.
I believe these two assumptions should be questioned. On
the one hand, it is not clear that adults produce ironic
utterances deliberately (Gibbs, 2012). It has been proven that
adults may comprehend the meaning of an ironic utterance
without explicitly recognizing its ironic character (Gibbs and
O’Brien, 1991). We rather expect that a communicative act be
used appropriately. Our data indicate that young children may
sometimes use ironic utterances appropriately. On the other
hand, recent experimental studies have shown that children as
young as 3 years old can understand the communicative, non-
literal intent of ironic utterances (Loukusa and Leinonen, 2008;
Angeleri and Airenti, 2014).
The previous considerations prompt us to reconsider the
relationship between the use of sophisticated forms of humor and
ToM abilities. A result of this reconsideration might be to extend
the concept of ToM. A number of recent studies have shown
that infants can attribute epistemic states to agents, including
false beliefs (Onishi and Baillargeon, 2005; Luo, 2011). These
findings support the hypothesis that psychological reasoning, or
an abstract capacity to represent and reason about false beliefs,
emerges early in infancy (Baillargeon et al., 2016). This reasoning
capacity, often characterized as implicit (i.e., intuitive), would
persist in older children and adults when the capacity of explicit
reasoning has developed.
These results are abundantly debated in the developmental
literature. The core of the debate centers on resolving the
1The status of hyperbole is discussed in the literature. Although it has
been traditionally associated with metaphor and irony, recent work designates
hyperbole as a distinct figure of speech (Carston and Wearing, 2015).
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discrepancy between these results and the fact that 3-year-old
children fail the classical false-belief tasks (Low and Perner, 2012;
Perner and Roessler, 2012). More generally, the problem entails
explaining the relationship between the capacities exhibited by
infants during spontaneous tasks and the capacities that older
children and adults display when they are requested to perform
verbal ToM tasks. Two questions are fundamental with respect
to this problem. One question concerns whether precocious
abilities are mentalistic. The second question concerns the role of
language acquisition and executive functions in the development
of more mature reasoning skills.
To explain the discrepancy between infants’ and older
children’s performances on false belief tasks, Butterfill and
Apperly (2013) postulate the existence of two distinct systems.
Before being able to represent mental states, children would
develop a minimal ToM, an efficient yet inflexible system implied
in precocious social abilities. The researchers assume that a
minimal ToM involves representing belief-like states but does not
involve representing propositional attitudes as such. Therefore,
due to its limitations, this system would be unable to deal with
complex sets of mental states.
San Juan and Astington (2012) note that no plausible theory
exists to explain how children progress from implicit (i.e.,
automatic) reasoning to explicit (i.e., controlled) reasoning. In
particular, they stress the possible role of social and linguistic
experiences in facilitating this progression.
Other authors have emphasized the influence of social
experiences, which may help to explain individual differences
in the development of ToM abilities (Apperly, 2012; Hughes
and Devine, 2015). Also Baillargeon et al. (2016) concede that
we possess insufficient knowledge regarding the development of
infants’ ability to infer and reason about others’ mental states and
the factors that contribute to individual differences.
Kovács et al. (2010) conducted a series of experiments that
supported the hypothesis of a typically human attitude to
encode others’ beliefs. They showed that the mere presence
of social agents is sufficient to automatically trigger online
belief computations in both 7-month-old infants and adults.
On the other hand, some studies show that in false belief tests,
perspective tracking can be disrupted by the request to use
explicit language, a phenomenon also attested in both children
and adults (Rubio-Fernández, 2013; Rubio-Fernández and
Geurts, 2013). Considered together, these findings support the
assumption that intuitive and explicit reasoning are alternative
forms of reasoning, even though they may coexist in principle.
I believe these findings show that young children are able
to monitor others’ behavior and to adapt to their actions
regardless of how precocious forms of intuitive comprehension
of agents’ actions are characterized (Airenti, 2015). Studies
on intersubjectivity have shown that very precociously young
children can interact with adults (Trevarthen, 1998). It is
reasonable to believe that this finding implies that young children
react to adults’ behavior. However, no evidence exists that infants
can represent propositional attitudes as such. Moreover, it is
not clear that implicit reasoning can be considered indicative
of having developed a minimal ToM. At issue is more than a
terminological problem; defining implicit reasoning as evidence
of ToM, though a minimal form thereof, hides the specific
nature of intuitive reasoning about others, namely, the fact that
such reasoning develops in interactions and is inseparable from
the communicative intentionality characterizing infant behavior.
In naturalistic situations, perspective tracking is one way of
establishing common ground that enables communication.
Other ways exist, such as emotion recognition, which is
particularly relevant for acknowledging a playful interaction and,
subsequently, humor.
Hence, I argue that we must postulate not precocious ToM
abilities but precocious communicative abilities. Precocious
communicative abilities allow young children to interact with
others efficiently and to enter what has been called a community
of minds (Nelson et al., 2003; Nelson, 2005).
Humor is a form of communication that children acquire
as they do all other forms of communication. They perform
it in their interactions with adults and, later, with peers.
Developmental pragmatics assumes that children acquire speech
acts, or communicative units, that initially entail only acts and
subsequently include language and acts (Bruner, 1975). Two facts
are crucial to consider. First, children acquire communicative
acts simultaneously with the conditions of their use, that is,
communicative formats (Bruner, 1983) or games (Airenti et al.,
1993a; Airenti, 2010). Second, they learn that playing with the
conditions of applicability of communicative acts can generate
amusement. Thus, we can provide an interactional definition of
how the unexpected that creates humor is produced, namely, by
playing with the conditions of applicability of a communicative
game. This definition explains why children may use non-
literal communication in interactions yet be unable to define its
features.
The observation of infants has shown that humorous
interactions occur in the first year after birth (Reddy, 1991).
Already at this preverbal age, children play with others’
expectations. The simplest and most common children’s social
game is peek-a-boo. With respect to the categories previously
mentioned, it is the mildest form of teasing. It provokes
immediate laughter and is based on shared knowledge of the
immediate physical surroundings.
Other precocious typical teasing games combine acts and
language. Adults help familiarize children with these formats.
Consider, for instance, the use of nursery rhymes. In many
cultures, parents perform nursery rhymes, which prompt the
child to expect a particular unexpected event, namely, tickling.
The following is a common English example:
Round and round the garden
like a teddy bear
one step, two step
tickle you under there!
This nursery rhyme associates a simple story with movements
performed on the child’s arm that result in a teasing episode,
which provokes laughter. In this case, the child learns to play
with expectations using both gestures and words in an already
elaborated manner, compared with, for instance, the simpler
game of peek-a-boo.
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What children acquire is a specific form of communication,
namely, teasing, which is performed by playing with others’
expectations. Parents are often amazed by the creativity of their
children. In fact, if we examine the literature and our corpus of
collected data, we may be surprised to find a repeated appearance
of a limited number of communicative games that have a teasing
quality and that most children play. As discussed, children play
with others’ feelings and with expectations regarding their own
abilities. They mock others by imitating and ridiculing their
behavior. They can negate an understanding that is evidently
shared. They may justify their own mistaken or clumsy behavior
by redefining it in an amusing manner. They provoke laughter by
assuming an adult’s stance. All of these communicative games are
continuous with forms of humor that have a teasing component
and are classified as irony or sarcasm when performed by adults.
According to the existing literature, young children cannot
distinguish between non-literal communication and lies. In
fact, children’s immature ToM prevents them from explicitly
expressing this distinction. However, this fact does not reveal
insight regarding their capacity to produce and comprehend non-
literal communicative acts (i.e., to use these communicative acts
appropriately). It is reasonable to infer that a 3.3-year-old girl
who laughs and tells her mother, “I am not sucking my thumb,”
while actually sucking her thumb is not lying but playing a teasing
game. If the child intended to lie, she would have employed a
hiding strategy, regardless of its naiveté or effectiveness. As noted,
other typical situations exist in which the use of irony constitutes
an alternative to lying—for example, when a child cannot conceal
a wrongdoing such as not having eaten a disliked food or having
soiled an article of clothing. In these cases, irony is used as a
possible escape. As the 3.3-year-old girl who soiled her T-shirt
with ice cream says while looking at her mother, “This way, I can
also eat the ice cream at home!” (‘Così mangio il gelato anche a
casa!’).
I have argued that the results of numerous experimental
studies indicate only where young children fail in attempting
to interpret non-literal communication. Children are unable to
explicitly appreciate the nature of non-literal communication.
We can now add what young children can accomplish with
respect to this particular form of non-literal communication:
humor. Children intentionally produce teasing communicative
acts. Among these forms of teasing communicative acts, we also
find incipient forms of irony.
Consider a hypothetical example of irony in adult
communication. Two colleagues are standing near a coffee
machine and see another colleague approaching. One of them
exclaims, “Here is the hidden gem!” This exclamation is a perfect
example of a “specific and succinct” comment about a situation
in which the richness derives from the presuppositions shared
between the two interlocutors. We can imagine that the two
colleagues share the knowledge that the newcomer is particularly
praised by his superiors, that he considers himself worthy of this
consideration and that they, on the contrary, do not think that
he deserves it. Let us now consider an actual example from our
corpus that involves a young child. A 3-year-old boy is playing
in a park. He sees another little boy approaching and tells his
mother, “Look! My friend is coming!” Here, too, is a specific and
succinct comment about a situation. The difference from the
earlier example is that the presuppositions are simpler: the boy
shares with his mother the knowledge that he does not like the
other boy.
In conclusion, children may produce and understand non-
literal communication without having developed a full-fledged
ToM. Teasing communicative games do not differ in principle
from serious communicative games; in fact, they are acquired
in an identical way and become increasingly complex with
age. Many elements may relate to their development, such
as an improvement in language abilities, executive functions,
social and ToM skills. Importantly, however, the considerably
more sophisticated adult forms of communication involve the
development of communicative formats that are already present
in childhood.
DISCUSSION
This work aimed to delineate a developmental framework for
humor. The intent was twofold: to examine the different forms
that humor can assume in childhood and to use the analysis of
children’s humor to illuminate typical problems that are debated
in research on humor in general.
The existing literature typically distinguishes between
spontaneous forms of humor, which infants and young children
perform, and refined forms of humor, which only older
children and adults can produce and understand. Based on
this distinction, young children would be able to perform only
forms of humor that generate immediate laughter. Other forms
of humor that adults perform, such as irony, are generally
regarded as considerably more complex and thus beyond the
capacity of children to perform. In particular, young children
are regarded as lacking the ability to produce and understand
such forms of humor because they cannot comprehend their
non-literal character. This task of comprehension would require
inferring others’ mental states and, hence, the development of a
full-fledged ToM.
If, however, we conduct naturalistic observation, the situation
appears differently. When asked to record their children’s
humorous interactions in everyday life, parents report that even
young children may use complex forms of humor appropriately.
I have contended that young children acquire complex forms of
humor within communicative games and that this acquisition
does not require the ability to explicitly express an understanding
of the implied mental states.
I argue that to more fully comprehend the problem of
acquiring complex forms of humor, it is helpful to analyze
what humor entails as a form of communication in general. To
facilitate this analysis, I proposed to focus on a form of humor
that begins developing very early in life and is present in a
more advanced form in adults, namely, teasing. I discuss several
examples of teasing that are typical of different ages. Reddy
(1991), who studied teasing in infants, defined teasing as playing
with others’ expectations. I propose that playing with others’
expectations by teasing should be considered the crucial feature
that characterizes humor in general and constitutes the link
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between the simplest and the most sophisticated forms of humor.
Teasing might thus be considered the prototypical form of humor
from which irony and sarcasm also arise. In fact, even if teasing
and irony are considered distinct forms of communicative acts, it
is widely accepted that irony may include a teasing component.
Thus, I propose the possibility of a basic form of human
communication characterized by playing with others’
expectations by teasing. Children acquire this form of
communication very early in their interactions with adults.
Such communication games may assume different forms that
become increasingly sophisticated during development, aided by
the development of ToM abilities. However, even young children
may acquire communicative games that include sophisticated
forms of humor and use them. For instance, irony may be part
of a game of justification. Children may know that a parent
who laughs at a self-ironic description of a misdeed will likely
be more indulgent and will abstain from scolding the child.
Another example is the appropriation of a communicative game
typical of adults. This is a simple move, and it is clear that
this appropriation is unexpected and provokes laughter in the
audience. We can thus see that acquiring the ability to perform
more complex acts of humor does not differ from the way an
interactional perspective explains the acquisition of the ability
to perform the simplest acts of humor. Consider the case of a
child who discovers that if she wears her mother’s shoes, she will
provoke laughter in the audience. These acts exemplify young
children’s communicative cleverness. This cleverness is not
apparent if we ask children to provide explicit explanations of
conceptual differences. The same claim could be made of other
communicative acts. We do not doubt that when children make
a request, they produce an intentional act, even if they are unable
to define a request as a communicative act.
Therefore, we can assert that in early stages of development,
a child’s use of the communicative game is deliberate, whereas
irony is not (Gibbs, 2012). Later in development, acquiring ToM
in connection with linguistic proficiency and other cognitive
capacities enables the performance of more elaborate forms of
humor and the possibility of using communicative games more
flexibly.
From a cognitive perspective, the degree of complexity of
the different forms of humor depends on the complexity of
the communicative game. Thus, rather than claiming that
one form of humor is simple while another form (irony, for
instance) is difficult, I suggest that the difficulty or simplicity of
producing and comprehending a given instance of humor derives
from the combination of several constituents that construct
the specific communicative game. Most remarkable among
these constituents is common ground. Every utterance draws
its communicative meaning from a common ground that the
interlocutors share. Common ground constitutes the context
for comprehension. Nonetheless, the aspects considered when
identifying common ground may differ considerably (Clark,
1996). For instance, the common ground that is merely the
immediate physical context (what the interlocutors see or hear,
for instance) differs notably from one that is an element of
general knowledge. In Angeleri and Airenti (2014), we showed
that children more easily understand the communicative intent of
ironic utterances when the common ground is directly perceived
by the interlocutors (contingent irony) than in situations in which
irony is based on background knowledge that the interlocutors
are supposed to share but that is not directly perceived or
mentioned (background irony).
Another factor that may influence the ease of comprehension
is the degree of indirectness. Planning an indirect act to hurt
someone’s feelings, as in the case of sarcasm, is considerably more
difficult than directly mimicking an interlocutor’s behavior to
ridicule him or her.
At least two research directions are apparent. I propose
several characteristics as relevant for defining different forms of
humor. However, it is possible that other characteristics could be
considered. I contend that such additional characteristics would
make the present model more elaborate but would not invalidate
it. Another direction that could be examined in depth is the
relationship between comprehension and production. Are these
two processes symmetrical in acts of humor? Only a systematic
study could indicate whether production and comprehension
develop simultaneously.
Comparing production and comprehension is not easy
because of the different methods that may be utilized to
study these two aspects. With respect to the production of
humor, the only effective method is an observation technique.
We cannot provoke the use of humor in an experimental
situation. Moreover, we must resort to parent reports, which
are observations made by non-professional observers. Naturally,
parents are given precise instructions; for instance, they are
asked to describe the context in which any specific humorous
utterance is produced. The main problem involved in the use of
this method is that it does not allow precise quantitative analysis
because it is impossible to ensure that all parents devote the same
attention to the observation of their children’s behavior. However,
these limitations are balanced by the possibility to access the
child’s spontaneous behavior at any time. I expect that future
work will confirm that even very young children use a wide
range of humorous utterances. Moreover, I expect to find similar
typologies of humor in all children, namely, the forms that we
have observed in our sample.
In contrast, comprehension can be assessed through
experiments. Experiments may also be used to evaluate the
factors that influence performance in humor tasks. According to
the theoretical assumptions expressed in this paper, one would
expect no direct correlation between performance in humor
tasks and performance in ToM verbal tasks. This is the result
that we obtained in Angeleri and Airenti (2014). In this study,
we tested children aged 3.0–6.5 years in a task of comprehension
of different forms of humor. Children were administered the
Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test – Revised (PPVT-R; Dunn
and Dunn, 1981; Italian adaptation: Stella et al., 2000) and three
classical ToM tasks of first and second order: the Smarties task
(Perner et al., 1987), the Sally-Ann task (Wimmer and Perner,
1983), and the ice-cream van story task (Baron-Cohen, 1989).
To identify the specific effects of ToM and language on humor
comprehension, we used path analysis. Our analyses suggested
that the correlation between humor understanding and ToM was
spurious, as indicated by the shared effects of language ability on
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ToM and humor and by the shared indirect effects of children’s
age on language and ToM.
My perspective is compatible with the point of view expressed
by Reddy (2007) that intentional insincere communication is
acquired alongside with intentional sincere communication. My
perspective differs in its approach to insincere communicative
acts. I suggest that two different forms of insincerity must
be distinguished: proper deceit and non-literal communication.
From a pragmatic perspective, we may regard non-literal
utterances as instances of insincerity because they violate the
Gricean maxim of quality. However, these different forms of
insincerity are acquired differently. Planning a deceit requires
the use of ToM abilities, whereas the other forms of insincerity
are precociously developed as part of children’s communicative
repertoire.
I believe my perspective is advantageous to explain the fact
that young children may produce sophisticated forms of humor,
as the empirical evidence shows, without attributing them ToM
abilities that are not demonstrated in other domains. The latter
is true particularly for deceit, which children do not perform
until a later age (Peskin, 1992; Airenti and Angeleri, 2011;
Lee, 2013). Acquiring the ability to play communicative games
is unrelated to acquiring the ability to distinguish true from
false statements and to instill false beliefs in others. As shown,
in communicative interactions, young children use non-literal
communication, particularly humorous communication, as an
alternative to lying.
This perspective is also useful for obtaining a better
understanding of humor in general and of the relationship
among humor, irony and teasing in particular. Studies on humor
aim to define and categorize the different forms of humor.
They encounter difficulty with the fact that humor manifests
multifariously and that it is difficult to formulate definitions
that allow the construction of a categorization without overlaps.
The fact of laughter cannot be a criterion because several
forms of humor exist in which an association with laughter
is indirect and even loose or absent. We also cannot identify
a function that characterizes all forms of humor. Sometimes
humor represents a simple way to express immediate amusement,
whereas other times it may function primarily to strengthen
the relationship between the interlocutors by stressing and
confirming shared knowledge. It may also be used to indirectly
criticize an interlocutor in ways that can range from mild to
harsh.
I propose the construction of a unifying cognitive framework
underlying the communicative games from which different
manifestations of humor arise. I argue that this framework can
be constructed by analyzing one of the most precocious and
pervasive forms of communication, namely, teasing. Teasing is
a feature that can be found in all forms of humor, whether
simple or complex. I thus propose to characterize humor as
a form of communication that has a teasing component and
that plays with expectations. Children acquire this general
communicative format during their initial interactions with
adults. This communicative format becomes increasingly flexible
and articulated with age and with cognitive acquisitions,
including language abilities, ToM and relational competence.
Consider a final example of a child’s utterance. When his
mother’s car does not start, the 3.6-year-old boy asks, “Are we
going to sleep here, mom?” How might we determine, in this case,
whether this utterance is ironic? I would propose this remark as a
typical form of teasing and, therefore, of humor.
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